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Abstract
Intrusion detection system (IDS) has become an essential component of computer security in the
organization. IDS can provide multiple benefits for the effective information security, at the same the
evaluation of IDS must be concerned for the management. The overall objective of decision-making as
regards information security products (for instance IDS) is to select the most effective as well as the most
cost-efficient among the competitive ID systems. The paper introduces the evaluation model of existing IDS.
The main attributes of competing ID systems (NIDS and HIDS) performance are analysed in a multicriteria hierarchy with the inclusion of the main types of decision-makers and their objective as
determinant factors.
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INTRODUCTION
A computer or network intrusion, sometimes called an attack, is a sequence of related actions by a
malicious adversary whose goal is violate some stead or implied policy regarding appropriate use of
computer or network. Example includes stealing protected data, denying service to a user or group of users,
or performing probing actions in an attempt to gain information in preparation for an attack. Kemmerer &
Vigna (2002) point out that the growing reliance on the Internet and worldwide connectivity has greatly
increased the potential damage that can be inflicted by such attacks.
It is not possible to prevent all attacks with security policies, firewalls, or other mechanisms because system
and application software often contains unknown weaknesses or bugs. In addition, attackers continually
exploit complex, unforeseen interactions between software components and network protocols. Successful
attacks inevitably occur despite the best security precautions.
Effective IDS system has become a necessity for any organization. The purpose of the paper is to construct
a comprehensive model of IDS evaluation, including the main players and their objectives.

Intrusion detection system (IDS) has become an essential component of computer security to detect and
respond to attacks. They monitor a host or network and issue alerts, sometime called putative detections,
when abnormal behaviour is detected or an attack is suspected to have occurred. Schell (1998) explains
there are some approaches for intrusion detection find attacks in real time and can stop an attack in
progress. Others provide after the fact information about attacks and can help repair damage, understand
the attack mechanism, and rescue the possibility of future attacks of the same type (Sommer, 1999).
Advanced intrusion detection systems attempt to detect never before see new attack, as well as previously
see old attacks. The main thrust of this document is to builds the model for evaluation IDS types by using
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP).

IDS EVALUATION
The Intrusion detection system in a similar way complements the firewall security (Rosenthal, 2002). The
firewall protects an organization from malicious attacks from the Internet and the Intrusion detection
system detects if someone tries to break in through the firewall or manages to break in the firewall security
and tries to have access on any system in the trusted side and alerts the system administrator in case there is
a breach in security.
Vendors frequently release new IDS products and aggressively compete for market share. Evaluating these
new systems is not a trivial task, and credible, comprehensive product evaluation information is lacking.
Hiring and retaining personnel to competently administer security in general and intrusion detection in
particular are increasingly challenging. Rapid changes in information technology make it difficult for an
organization to implement an effective, long-term security strategy (Schultz, 2003).
Intrusion Detection Systems are generally implemented in one of two ways. These implementations include
host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) and network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS).
Host-Based Intrusion Detection (HIDS): It is emphasized by Stillerman, Marceau, & Stillman (1999) that
the detection software is loaded directly on to the computer it will be monitoring, and the data is audited
from a single host. Each computer on the system will need to have the intrusion detection software running
in order to be effective in identifying an attack. Host-based IDSs typically monitor system, event and
security logs on Windows NT and syslog in Unix environments. If any changes in these files are detected,
the IDS compares the new log entry with attack signatures to see if there is a match. If a match is found, the
system will alert the administrator as well as perform other calls to action. There are two classes of hostbased intrusion detection
Network-Based Intrusion Detection (NIDS): Packets on the network and audit data from several hosts are
monitored on the particular segment the NIDS is covering. As the packets pass the sensor, they are
examined for their similarities to a signature. Lam, Hui, & Chung, (1996) point out that Network Intrusion
Detection Systems are primarily concerned with remote intrusion from an external source outside of the
network. If an attack is detected, the NIDS will notify the administrator, terminate the connection and/or
record the session for forensic analysis and evidence collection.

EVALUATION APPROACH
To accomplish the objectives of the study, the Analytical hierarchy process (AHP), may be applied as a
research methodology. AHP is “a theory of measurement, concerned with deriving dominance priorities
from paired comparisons of homogeneous elements with respect to a common criterion or attribute” (Saaty,
1994b). AHP imitates the natural tendency of humans to organize decision criteria in a hierarchical form,
starting with general criteria and moving to more specific, detailed criteria.

The advantages of AHP, applied in the specific context of this study may include the following:
AHP provides an easy to understood and flexible model that may be applied as a solution to a range of
unstructured problems. The AHP allows the selection of the best alternative from a number of possible
alternatives, also it is equally applicable as a means of ranking a number of alternatives (Datta,
Sambasivarao, Kodali, & Deshmukh, 1992). The method includes the hierarchical structuring, where every
determinant attribute identified may be evaluated as an element in the system of different levels of
attributes. Interdependence of system elements (for instance, technical or business aspects of security
system evaluation) may also be identified and tested empirically;
The method synthesizes a representative outcome from diverse judgments, providing the consistent way of
determining priorities;
The relative priorities of factors are considered and selection of the best alternative (the most efficient type
of IDS) is possible based on the overall objective of the study (evaluation of different protocols);
AHP provides a scale for measuring both tangible and intangible determinant attributes. Using the AHP
allows the decision-making attributes to be ranked relative to each other, rather than trying to put the
elements into an absolute scale (Saaty, 1998).
The utility function of AHP implies that the whole (the overall effectiveness in this study) equals the sum
of utilities assigned to system elements (the determinant attributes of an ID system choice)
While the AHP does not completely eliminate the subjectivity inherent in making judgments such as this, it
can provide a mathematical structure to help us deal with the problem.

CALCULATION OF WEIGHTS
When the organizations consider the choice of alternative IDS types, such as NIDS and HIDS, they want to
select IDS types that will maximize their utility for information security. It is also important to note that
organizations have constraints, such as a limited amount of financial resources to spend on information
security. The following analysis of protocol’s options uses a utility function to determine which option is
preferable, given the set of criteria. A utility function is a mathematical representation of a firm’s
preferences (Datta et al., 1992). For the purpose of this analysis, we use six criteria in two different
alternatives. We are designing a comparative analysis of the criteria to determine weights for the utility
function by using weighted sum of relative values.
MAX∑ (W i) (RV i)=(W1)(RV1)+(W2)(RV2)+(W3)(RV3)+ . . . +(Wn)(RVn)
s.t. Constraints
Where: RVi = Relative Value of each alternative
th

i =Evaluation Criterion
th

Wi = Weight of the i Evaluation Criterion
We will evaluate the data by using a linear equation for each type of IDS (NIDS, and HIDS) and then
compare the results.

It is important to consider that the overall objective of evaluating different IDS types is determined by the
parties involved in the process of implementation and effective functioning of information security systems
in the organizations. These parties may include: 1) Company’s IT managers, in particular the CIO and other
IT executives and specialists, 2) the company’s financial management, responsible for making decisions on
the purchase of a particular security products and 3) manufacturers of information security products and
network engineering companies. Different groups of people involved have certain objectives that may
contradict with one another. For instance, IT and business executives in the company may have different
perceptions about the costs of network security systems implementation and maintenance. Benefits of a
particular IDS types may be perceived differently by each group of decision makers involved. Therefore,
the process of decision-making, as well as the score for the determinant attributes and the calculation of
relative weights can be influenced by different objectives, related to each group.

DESCRIPTION OF CRITERIA
Sensor and director platforms
The major components are a sensor platform and a director platform. The sensor platform monitors the
network and the director platform provides a single GUI management interface for the end user.
Ability to monitor user specific actions
Can both types of IDS monitor the file system for file permission changes, privilege escalation, and watch
certain users? Any changes that can happen, system engineer would be notified right away, some even have
the ability to prevent these attacks from ever occurring.

Management protection
Management operations themselves must be protected from intruders as well. For example if management
commands travel over an in-band network, there is a risk that the IDS itself get compromised, this includes
the vulnerability to DOS attacks. This issue becomes especially important when IDS is centrally managed
via some sort of management system. Authentication and confidentiality can be provided by using
encryption, a lot of commercial IDS already have encrypted communication implemented.
Performance compatibility with other network security devices (ex. firewall)
An important design aspect in IDS is the capability to perform well at the intended locations in the
communication and information systems of the organization. Especially for IDS located at high-speed
networks, switches performance becomes an issue. Especially the smart IDS need a lot of computational
power to perform state-full inspection on the network traffic.
Incident detection
Incident response is become aware of suspicious activity and identifying attacker. It should be contained
and collected of digital evidence. All incident responses include reporting, and recording lesson learned
from intrusion actions.
Passive and reactive systems
Can Host and Network based systems either be passive systems or reactive based systems? Passive systems
detect possible attacks, log the information and issue an alert. Reactive systems attempt to react in some
way to the malicious content it has spotted. Though reactive systems implement nice defensive
mechanisms, they are still prone to false positives.

Logging off malicious users
If activity is encountered that appears to be malicious, a reactive system can log the offending user off the
system and block malicious users from accessing the system until further notice possibly from an
administrator of that host.

Equation 1. Utility Equation – NIDS, HIDS

Utility (NIDS and HIDS) = W1SD+W2AM+W3PC+W4ID+W5PR+W6LO
where:
Sensor and director Platforms = SD
Ability to monitor user specific actions = AM
Performance compatibility with other network security devices = PC
Incident detection = ID
Passive and reactive systems = PR
Logging off malicious users = LO

AHP assumes that the decision maker must make comparisons of importance between all possible pairs of
attributes, using a verbal scale (from the most important to the least important) for each variant (see table
1). The decision maker also makes similar comparisons for all pairs of subcriteria for each criterion (Saaty,
1994a). The information obtained in this process is used to calculate the scores for subcriteria, with respect
to each criterion.
When AHP is used to make choices, the alternatives being considered are compared with respect to the
subcriteria/criteria included in the lowest level of the hierarchy, and the global weights are determined for
each of the alternatives within each sub criterion (Frei & Harker, 1999). The global weights summed over
the subcriteria, are then used to determine the relative ranking of the alternatives. The alternative with the
highest global weight sum is the most desirable alternative (Saad, 2001). In focusing on decisions, tactical
as well as strategic, tradeoffs among multiple, competing objectives, a basic approach based on
preference/utility theory and including subjective probabilities, are utilized (Datta et al., 1992).
Figure 1 represents the proposed determinant attributes for ID system evaluation (see Appendix 1)

Table 1 represents the possible measuring constructs for hierarchical evaluation of determinant attributes of
ID system effectiveness.
Table 1: AHP Scale
Value
1
3

Preference
Equally important
Moderately more important

Explanation
Two factors contribute equally to the objective
Experience and judgment slightly favor one
factor over the other
Experience and judgment strongly favor one
factor over another

5

Strongly more important

7

Very strongly more important

9

Extremely more important

2,4,6,8

Intermediate values

A factor is strongly favored and its dominance is
demonstrated in practice
Reserved for situations where the difference
between the items being compared is so great
that they are on the verge of not being directly
comparable
To reflect compromise between two adjacent
judgments

Pairwise Comparison Matrix

Windows or
Unix Platform
Easy
installation,
setup and
operation
management
Performance
compatibility
with other
network
security devices
Incident
detection
Attack detection
Security
knowledge
Requirement

Criterion weight

Security knowledge
Requirement

Attack detection

Incident detection

Performance
compatibility with
other network security

Easy installation, setup
and operation
management

Windows or Unix
Platform

The values input into Table 2 will be based on the previously discussed criteria identified for ID system
evaluation.
Table 2 Pairwise Comparison Matrix

We will use survey questionnaires to create comparison matrix in the table. The decision makers in an
organization presumably have different perceptions of information security needs, related to a particular
organization they represent, and will be likely to input the values in Table 2 differently. The purpose of this
paper is to present a practical method of ID systems evaluation, given a set of parameters or decisionmaking criteria. Given the nature of information security products, no result is applicable to every situation.

CONCLUSION
The complex nature of information security products implies a large amount of effort in evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of a particular product. However, the construction of the hierarchy of determinant
attributes of information security protocols can be an effective methodological approach to minimize the
difficulties.
The next step in the research study will be a validation of the suggested research model empirically and
testing the factors proposed in the model. In particular, the determinant attributes of IDS effectiveness
should be identified and analysed.
Proper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of IT managers’ perceptions of IDS performance will
help developing more feasible and cost-efficient solutions to the security of the information systems.
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Appendix 1. Figure 1: Intrusion detection system evaluation: the hierarchy of determinant attributes
Evaluation of IDS protocols
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